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A LACK OF TRUST: SOUTH DAKOTA v. YANKTONSIOUX
TRIBE AND THE ABANDONMENT OF THE TRUST
DOCTRINE IN RESERVATION DIMINISHMENT CASES
A.J. Taylor
Abstract: Over the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly confronted
the issue of whether Indian reservation lands sold to non-Indian settlers at the turn-of-the-
century under Congress's allotment policy remain tribal territory for jurisdictional purposes.
As the means of adjudicating these reservation diminishment cases, the Court has adopted a
troubled three-pronged analytical approach. The Court's approach circumvents well-
established rules of construction and diverges significantly from historic principles embodied
in the trust doctrine that forms the ideological foundation of Indian law. The Court's recent
decision in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe exposes important shortcomings in the
Court's multi-factor analysis and reveals the Court's effort to reach outcomes in these cases
that favor non-Indian interests. This Note argues that the Court's current approach to the
diminishment issue erodes tribal sovereignty and arrogates to the Court the role of balancing
Indian and non-Indian interests, which traditionally has been a prerogative left to Congress.
This Note advocates that the Court return to settled tenets of Indian law and reestablish an
analytical framework that focuses exclusively on statutory language as the sole means for
adjudicating diminishment cases.
A well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end the
need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued [Indian] law for
a number ofyears.'
Jurisdictional questions between tribal and state governments
constitute some of the most vexing problems in federal Indian law. Many
of the current problems derive directly from the vestiges of turn-of-the-
century congressional Indian policy. The allotment program Congress
instituted in the late nineteenth century opened numerous Indian
reservations to white settlement. As a result, Indian and non-Indian lands
became intermingled, creating checkerboard patterns of land settlement
within the original boundaries of many reservations. Because jurisdiction
in Indian law often depends on the territorial boundaries of a reservation,
the effect of allotment on the status of land opened for settlement a
century earlier proves vitally important in ascertaining the scope of
modem tribal jurisdiction.
Frequently, states argue that an allotment-era act of Congress reduced
in size, or "diminished,"2 tribal territory, thus decreasing tribal
1. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
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jurisdiction. For over three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has
struggled to develop an analytical framework to adjudicate these
disputes; yet, conceptual clarity and predictability remain elusive. Each
new decision in this area of law has turned on increasingly attenuated
points of law, resulting in the alarmingly malleable three-pronged
analytical approach enunciated by the Court in Solem v. Bartlett?
The Supreme Court's recent decision in South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of the Solem test. Utilizing
Solem's three-part test, the Court reasoned that contradictory and
ambiguous statutory language, meager legislative history, subsequent
state jurisdictional control, and contemporary racial demographics
indicated congressional intent to diminish the size of the Yankton Sioux
Reservation in 1894.4 In so doing, the Yankton Court abandoned settled
principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that allowed the Court to
use its own subjective perceptions of non-Indian interests to reach
political issues.
This Note argues that as applied in Yankton, Solem's test for
determining reservation diminishment is fundamentally flawed and
disregards the avowed canons of construction essential to Indian
jurisprudence. Part I briefly summarizes core concepts and policies in
Indian law and traces the development of the Supreme Court's analytical
approach in diminishment cases. Part II describes the Court's analysis
and its treatment of the diminishment doctrine in Yankton. Part III
contends that the Yankton Court reached the outcome it did because the
Solem test allows the Court to manipulate its analysis to grant state
government jurisdiction over disputed areas of Indian country. This Note
concludes that the Court should abandon the Solem test and return to an
approach that examines express statutory language in light of the rules of
construction that traditionally govern Indian law.
2. "Diminished" and "disestablished" are used interchangeably. "Disestablished" describes a
reservation's elimination, whereas "diminished" refers to a reservation's reduction in size.
Additionally, the word "terminated" is often interchanged with "disestablished." This Note uses the
terms in their appropriate contexts, but in instances where general reference is made, "diminished" is
the default term. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. waste Management Dist., 99 F.3d 1439,
1443 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789
(1998).
3. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
4. 118 S. Ct. 789, 805 (1998).
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I. HISTORICAL, JURISDICTIONAL, AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE DIMINISHMENT CASES
The enduring struggle over the application of state and tribal
jurisdiction in Indian country lies at the heart of the diminishment cases.'
Aggressive attempts by states to assert jurisdictional control in Indian
country, an increased sense of tribal goals, and friction among the three
sovereigns that compete for Indian lands form the bases of conflict in
these cases. To realize fully the ramifications of the diminishment cases
in the larger body of federal Indian law, one must understand the
jurisdictional framework that operates in Indian country, the persisting
legacy of the allotment policy, the competing interests at stake, and the
evolution of the Court's mode of analysis in the diminishment cases.
A. Contours ofJurisdiction in Indian Country
Indian tribal jurisdiction and the exclusion of state jurisdictional
control in Indian country stem from the doctrine of tribal sovereignty,6
first expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia.7 In
Worcester, the Court recognized Indian tribes as separate political
communities with geographical boundaries within which state laws held
no power.' The tribes thus possess exclusive sovereign control over
Indian territory, subordinate only to the federal plenary power.9
Indian sovereignty and the right to tribal self-government, with its
concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law, form the
backdrop against which jurisdictional control in Indian law is defined.'
Because tribal jurisdiction hinges on the definition of tribal territory,
subject matter jurisdiction in Indian law is largely geographically
based." Although the reservation is usually the major component of
tribal territory, the geographical boundaries of tribal territories are best
5. See Lauren Natasha Soil, The Only Good Indian Reservation Is a Diminished Reservation?:
The Nev and Diluted Canons of Construction in Indian Law, 41 Fed. B. News & J. 544 (1994).
6. See William C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 Utah L. Rev.
206 (1973).
7. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
S. Id. at 560-61.
9. Id.
10. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
11. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980); see also Judith V.
Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 3-5 (1995).
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defined by the term "Indian country."'" Thus, Indian country is defined
by the territorial boundaries of a given tribe, not property ownership. 3
Over time, the Supreme Court has weakened the original Worcester
bar to state intrusion. Generally, states possess no jurisdictional control
over Indian affairs unless expressly sanctioned by Congress. 14 Where
non-Indians' rights are at stake, however, the Court has increasingly
allowed state intrusion. 5 As a result, states can assert jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Indian country as long as the state does not interfere with
Indian property or rights, federal Indian programs, or tribal self-
government. 6 Nonetheless, Worcester has never been overruled and the
Court continues to recognize the strong territorial component of Indian
tribal sovereignty."
7
B. The Legacy ofAllotment in the Diminishment Cases
Support for dismantling reservations fueled late nineteenth-century
federal Indian policy.'8 The Dawes General Allotment Act, the
cornerstone of federal policy of the era, stipulated the division of
12. The statute defines Indian country as all lands, however owned, within the exterior boundaries
of an Indian reservation. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The statute also defines dependent Indian
communities and Indian allotments as "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Although § 1151 is a
criminal statute, the Supreme Court has held that "it generally applies as well to questions of civil
jurisdiction." Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975).
13. Royster, supra note 11, at 3.
14. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138,
142-43 (1984); White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143; McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174-75;
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
15. See generally South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (finding that tribe cannot
regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on federally-owned land within reservation); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that
Indian nations only have power to zone fee lands in Indian country that contain no significant non-
Indian presence); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (concluding that tribes cannot
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on fee lands inside reservation); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding that state
could tax Indian sales of cigarettes on reservation to non-Indians); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians).
16. See Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a
Modern Constitutional Democracy 106-11 (1987).
17. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
18. See Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-
1920 70-71 (1984) (explaining development of allotment policy).
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reservations into family-sized farms.' 9 The remaining land was declared
surplus, or "opened," and sold to non-Indians." Because the Dawes Act
supplied little more than a statement of intent,2' Congress often felt
prompted to enact special "surplus land acts" to ensure the opening of
particular reservations.22 The methods used to open reservation lands to
settlement varied. Some acts carried out terms of agreements negotiated
with tribes for the cession of surplus lands, whereas others, without tribal
consent, unilaterally opened surplus lands to non-Indian settlement.
Whatever the method, the purpose of the surplus lands acts was to return
Indian lands to the public domain and thereby allow white settlement.'
Although all the acts accomplished this, not all removed the lands from
the reservation.24 As a result, the boundaries of Indian country became
hard to define because Dawes Act era legislation intermixed non-Indian
and Indian lands on "old" reservations.
The diverse legislative scheme created by the Dawes Act and
subsequent surplus land acts have forced the courts to determine
arbitrarily Indian reservation boundaries based on different fact patterns
in each instance. The surplus land acts seldom detailed whether Congress
intended to open reservation lands for settlement or diminish a particular
reservation's boundaries.25 Faced with these difficulties, the courts
created the "diminishment" doctrine.26 If past congressional actions
returned the disputed lands to the public domain, the court deems the
reservation diminished and the tribe loses jurisdiction. If the reservation
holds its status, the tribe retains jurisdictional authority. Consequently,
diminishment doctrine forces courts to examine the language and intent
of antiquated legislation,27 leading to case-by-case analysis.
19. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388.
20. § 5,24 Stat. at 389-90.
21. The Dawes Act contained no timetables and few instructions for implementation. It
authorized, but did not require, the President to open reservation land for allotment. § 1, 24 Stat.
at 388.
22. Congress enacted 108 separate "surplus land acts" directing the allotment of specific
reservations across the nation. Conference of W. Attorneys Gen., American Indian Law Deskbook
47-50 (1993).
23. See Royster, supra note 11, at 9.
24. American Indian Law Deskbook, supra note 22, at 47-50.
25. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984).
26. See infra Part I.D.
27. American Indian Law Deskbook supra note 22, at 49.
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C. Competing Indian and Non-Indian Interests
States are frequently disgruntled by their lack of power within Indian
country, especially when reservations are heavily populated with non-
Indians.2" Consequently, states continually attempt to assert jurisdictional
control over reservations. As a result, tribes often initiate lawsuits to
limit state encroachments into Indian country.29
It is primarily in this context of competing jurisdictional interests that
diminishment cases take on extreme significance.3" To defeat the strong
judicial ethos of protecting tribal sovereignty in Indian country, states
routinely contend that Congress diminished the reservation, thereby
eradicating tribal governmental power and allowing state jurisdiction. If
the geographic boundaries of a tribe's reservation are judicially
diminished, the tribe loses its sovereign jurisdictional power over the
removed area. Given this result, virtually no other issue poses a greater
threat to Indian tribal sovereignty than diminishment.
1. Reasonable Expectations and Non-Indian Concerns
Non-Indians living on lands purchased under the authority of the
surplus land acts have settled expectations that deserve consideration in
diminishment analysis. Non-Indians originally settled on open reservation
lands in good faith and secured legal title to their lands. Many reservations
contain multitudes of non-Indian businesses and landowners, often
outnumbering Indians and their enterprises." Commonly, non-Indians
have established local governments within the original reservation
boundaries that have operated in concert with state government and
exerted unchallenged jurisdiction for decades.32 If Indian tribes assert
political authority over non-Indians who live inside reservations, non-
Indians are excluded from the governing process because they cannot vote
in tribal elections and have no voice in tribal government.33 These facts,
non-Indians argue, guarantee them a right to government under non-Indian
28. See Soil, supra note 5, at 545.
29. Id.
30. The extensive issues at stake include civil court jurisdiction, taxation, environmental
regulation, zoning, and health and safety regulations. See Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 93.
31. Id. at88.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Removing Race Sensitive Issues from the Political Forum: Or Using
the Judiciary to Implicitly Take Someone's Country, 20 J. Contemp. L. 1, 3 (1994).
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authority and often impel the states to claim reservation diminishment to
protect non-Indian interests in Indian country.
2. Indian Sovereignty and the Court's Protection of Tribal Rights
In spite of these justifiable non-Indian considerations, countervailing
facts and legal doctrine support maintaining the original jurisdictional
boundaries of reservations. The tribes maintain that Congress established
the reservations for their exclusive use and non-Indians who wish to live
on Indian reservations impliedly consent to tribal authority.34 The Court
has generally agreed with the tribe's position based on the dominant
notion of protecting tribal sovereignty." Traditionally, the Court has
adhered to established principles of tribal self-government and
articulated rules that prevent state powers from encroaching upon tribal
privileges except by express congressional permission.
3 6
a. The Federal Trust Doctrine
The sovereign status of Indian tribes stands as the foremost principle
of Indian law.37 Tribes do not, however, possess absolute sovereignty
because they are subject to the overriding plenary power of Congress.3"
Pursuant to this plenary authority, Congress may limit tribal rights, even
though such acts restrict tribal sovereign powers.39
In the face of this awesome congressional power, the Supreme Court
formulated the federal trust doctrine to provide Indian rights maximum
protection.' ° The trust doctrine recognizes a federal governmental duty to
protect tribal sovereignty under a good faith standard.4' Essentially, the
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 n.12 (1973); Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
36. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 32.
37. Felix Cohen, Handbook ofFederal Indian Law 122-23 (1942); Royster, supra note 11, at 1.
38. Congress's plenary power derives from the U.S. Constitution's "Indian Commerce Clause."
This clause grants Congress far-reaching plenary authority over such areas as Indian lands, trade,
culture, religion, and government. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also Soil, supra
note 5, at 544.
40. Soil, supra note 5, at 544.
41. Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see also Ray Torgerson, Sword Wielding and
Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment ofthe Federal Trust Doctrine in American Indian Law, 2
Tex. F. on Civ. Liberties & Civ. Rts. 165, 168 (1996).
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federal government owes common law fiduciary duties to the tribes,
which the Court characterized as "moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust."'42 Under the trust doctrine, courts have acted as
the moral conscience in federal Indian law, protecting tribal powers from
state encroachment unless Congress has spoken clearly to the contrary.43
b. The Rules of Construction
To enforce the trust doctrine, the Court developed special rules of
statutory construction designed to impose appropriate limits on
Congress's plenary authority. When Congress has purported to abrogate
Indian rights, the courts have implemented these rules to determine the
intent and effect of the legislative action with staunch regard for the
federal trust relationship.'
Three primary rules exist. First, the Court resolves doubtful
expressions of congressional intent in favor of the tribes.45 The Court
must find clear intent to overcome this presumption either in a specific
statement on the face of a statute or its legislative history.4 6 Second, the
Court interprets ambiguous expressions as the Indians would have
understood them.47 Third, the Court liberally construes statutes and
treaties in favor of the Indians.4" The Court has also adopted in its Indian
jurisprudence the general statutory rule of construction that all statutory
clauses should be read together in a way that will make them consistent
and give all parts equal force.49 In applying these rules in diminishment
cases, the Court has emphasized that it "does not lightly conclude that an
Indian reservation has been terminated."5 Because the diminishment
42. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
43. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Lmv, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 (1996).
44. Sotl, supra note 5, at 546.
45. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
46. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766
(1985).
47. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
48. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
49. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979).
50. Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975).
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cases depend heavily on statutory interpretations concerning the status of
Indian lands, the rules of construction prove particularly significant.5
D. Development of the Diminishment Doctrine in the Court's
Jurisprudence
1. Early Diminishment Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court did not address most of the problems
concerning reservation diminishment until the modem era. 2 In the initial
diminishment cases, the Supreme Court focused on express statutory
language as the basis for its determinations. In Seymour v.
Superintendent, decided in 1962, the Court determined that the
controlling legislation did not contain "any language... expressly
vacating" the land in question. 3 In the 1973 case of Mattz v. Arnett, the
Court expanded its approach to include legislative history as an indicator
of congressional intent. 4 Nonetheless, in deference to Seymour, the
Court based its decision on the absence of express statutory language.5
Following Mattz, the Court began to look behind the written words of
statutes and treaties to determine their meaning. In Decoteau v. District
County Court,56  the Court found the relevant act of Congress
ambiguous,5 and thus introduced a series of new factors to find the
51. Although originally created by the Court to interpret treaties, the same standards of
construction have been applied to statutes. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226,247 (1985).
52. The Supreme Court first confronted the diminishment issue in 1909 in United States v.
Celestine, holding that once Congress established a reservation, "all tracts included within it remain
a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress." 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). Celestine
proposed that diminishment depended on the presence or absence of express statutory language
indicating Congress's clear intent Id. With the exception of Celestine, the dearth of diminishment
cases during the first half of the twentieth century probably occurred because during that period the
tribes and federal government instituted few suits to define or expand tribal powers. This trend
changed in 1959 with the landmark Supreme Court case Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
which marked the beginning of Indian law's modem era. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 16, at
7-23,32-37.
53. 368 U.S. 351, 355 (1962).
54. 412 U.S. 481,505 (1973).
55. "Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could be effected. But clear
termination language was not employed ..... Id. at 504. The Court refused "to infer an intent to
terminate the reservation" from legislative history. Id.
56. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
57. The 1891 Act that opened the reservation provided that the tribe agree to "cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the
1171
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requisite intent. First, the Court held that when Congress coupled cession
language with an unconditional commitment to compensate the tribe for
its land, a strong supposition existed that Congress meant to diminish the
tribe's reservation. Although the Decoteau Court stated that its ruling
derived from the face of the act, in reality the Court relied entirely on
surrounding circumstances to support its finding-a significant departure
from prior disestablishment analysis.59 Second, if a previously negotiated
agreement between the tribe and the federal government that served as
the basis for a congressional act existed, it strongly indicated
disestablishment.6 Third, state exercise of criminal or civil jurisdiction
over the reservation was a pertinent "surrounding circumstance" that
suggested termination.6I
Two years later, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, the Court relied on
a new aspect in the disestablishment analysis: the "unquestioned actual
assumption of state jurisdiction over the unallotted lands" after the
legislation took effect.62 Thus, the Court tacitly approved the incursion of
state jurisdiction over time as a factor in striking down tribal authority.63
The Court ignored the absence of other relevant factors emphasized in
preceding cases,' and instead focused on debatable language of
termination and fragments of legislative history.6'
unallotted lands." Id. at 436-39. The Court in Decoteau never stated unequivocally that this
language standing alone would result in disestablishment. See id. at 446, 448.
58. Id. at 446-47.
59. Id. at444-49.
60. Id. at 445. In Decoteau, three-fourths of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians signed the agreement
that provided for a lump sum payment of $2.50 per acre for lands ceded from the Lake Traverse
Reservation. Id. at 448. The presence of Indian consent makes Decoteau an anomaly. Most other
disestablishment cases involve a unilateral act of Congress. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399
(1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
61. The Court, however, did not appear to rely on the jurisdictional evidence as a basis for its
ruling. See Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 442, 449.
62. 430 U.S. 584, 603 (1977). The Rosebud Court based its decision on subsequent state
jurisdiction, which Decoteau mentioned only in passing. Id. at 598 n.20; see supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
63. The long-standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90%
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not only demonstrates the parties' understanding
of the meaning of the Act[s], but has created justifiable expectations which should not be upset
by so strained a reading of the Acts of Congress ....
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. The Court referred to the large non-Indian population in the region
and for the first time implied that demographic data served an evidentiary purpose. See infra notes
80-82, 94-97 and accompanying text.
64. In two cases, the Court relied on the lack of any sum-certain payment and the absence of any
express cession language to hold that Congress did not intend to diminish the reservations. Mattz v.
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2. The Modern Diminishment Test
In 1984, the Court attempted to sort its various approaches into a
functional test. In Solem v. Bartlett, the Court found that the prior cases
"established a fairly clean analytical structure," despite their assorted
emphases.6" The Court first reemphasized its trust responsibility,
declaring that the underlying principle governing the entire analysis
requires that "Congress clearly evince an 'intent... to change... the
boundaries' before diminishment will be found." 67 The Court then
outlined a three-part analysis adopting portions of the earlier cases'
analyses.S
The first prong of Solem states that the statutory language used to
open a reservation supplies the most probative evidence of intent:
explicit reference of cession or language in the statute that evinces a
surrender of all tribal interests strongly suggests that Congress
69diminished the reservation. When such language included a
commitment from Congress to compensate a tribe for the divestiture of
the open land by providing a "lump-sum" payment, "an almost
insurmountable presumption" exists that Congress intended to terminate
the surplus lands from the reservation." If, however, the act provided
that the tribe receive money placed in trust as the lands eventually sold,
Congress intended only that the Secretary of Interior act as the tribe's
"sales agent" and did not propose diminishment.7' Because the analysis
under prong one sets out express indicators of intent, it comports with the
rules of construction that require clarity of intent to find diminishment."
Amett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351
(1962). In Decoteau, the first case to find disestablishment, the Court distinguished Seymour and
Mattz by pointing to tribal consent to cession, the guarantee of a lump-sum payment to the tribe, and
the presence of statutory language that was at least arguably more suited to disestablishment.
Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). In Rosebud, only the third factor existed:
the 1904 surplus land act contained language nearly identical to that at issue in Decoteau. Rosebud,
430 U.S. 584. Instead, as the basis for its decision, the Rosebud Court seized on the factor of
subsequent state jurisdiction, which Decoteau had merely mentioned in passing. Id. at 603.
65. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 618-20, 626-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 465 U.S. 463,470 (1984).
67. Id.




72. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
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Under the second prong, the Court looks to legislative history as
evidence of intent.73 When the circumstances surrounding passage of the
act "unequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous understanding"
that the reservation would shrink, the Court infers diminishment.74
Legislative history can reveal an intent to diminish despite explicit
statutory language to the contrary.75
As the third prong of intent analysis, the Court embraced the
"pragmatic" factors it relied on in Decoteau and Rosebud: evidence of
subsequent state jurisdictional control over the surplus lands and the
demographic history of the area.76 The Court concluded that this type of
evidence may support de facto diminishment.77 Recognizing that relying
on demographic and jurisdictional history proved unconventional, the
Court attempted to justify its reliance on de facto diminishment by
qualifying it as "a necessary expedient" given the difficult task of
determining congressional intent from the allotment statutes.78 The Court
indicated, however, that reliance on de facto diminishment should be
limited, stating that such evidence would not prove dispositive if both the
statutory language and legislative history failed to provide compelling
evidence of diminishment.79
Applying this three-part analysis, the Court held that Congress did not
diminish the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. 0 The Court adhered to
the rules of construction in congruence with its analysis, discovering
73. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
74. Id. Reports presented to Congress and government negotiations with the tribe are particularly
important. Id. Negotiations that result in an agreement between the tribe and federal government for
cession of tribal lands provides evidence of intent to diminish. Id. at 471, 476-77. The Court also
stated that it would look to events that occurred after the passage of a surplus land act to decipher
Congress's intentions, including Congress's own treatment of the affected areas in the years
immediately following the opening. Id. at 471.
75. Id. In this respect, it seems that the second prong reasoning violates the rules of construction
in that an intrinsic ambiguity would exist between the express statutory terms and the legislative
history. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
76. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. Previously, the Court examined evidence of whether non-Indians
flooded onto the surplus lands of a reservation immediately after opening as possible evidence of
disestablishment. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977). However, the
Solem Court extended the consideration of demographics to include contemporary data of the
debated area. Solem, 465 U.S. at 480. This expansion proved pivotal in both the Solem and Hagen
holdings. See infra notes 80-82, 94-97 and accompanying text.
77. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471-72.
78. Id. at 472 n.13.
79. Id. at 472.
80. Id. at 481.
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ambiguities in the facts concerning all three prongs, and found no
diminishment.8 The extent of tribal versus non-Indian land ownership
and population proved crucial to the Court's determination.82
3. Hagen v. Utah and the Court's Increasing Reliance on De Facto
Diminishment
A decade later, the Supreme Court first applied the Solem test to reach
its highly controversial determination in Hagen v. Utah. 3 In Hagen, the
Supreme Court concluded that a series of surplus land acts, culminating
in the Act of 1905,' opened the Uintah Valley Reservation to white
settlement and diminished its boundaries." The Court disregarded
ambiguities that existed in the language and legislative history of the
acts.86 Instead, the Court emphasized the history of state jurisdictional
control over the open lands and the modem demographic composition of
the region to find support for de facto diminishment.87 The Court
scrutinized the statutory language used to open the reservation, relying
extensively on the initial 1902 Act that addressed allotment of the
reservation, even though that statute never became operative.88 The Court
embraced language in it that stated that unallotted lands "shall be
restored to the public domain"89 as evidence of congressional intent to
terminate reservation status.9" The Court ignored the fact that Congress
deleted the "public domain" language from the 1905 Act that actually
opened the reservation and replaced it with more tempered wording.9'
81. Id.
82. The Indian population constituted nearly 50% of the total population in the opened portion;
thus, the Court concluded that the area had not lost its "Indian character" and de facto diminishment
was defeated. Id. at 480.
83. 510 U.S. 399 (1994). For a general discussion of Hagen, see Soil, supra note 5.
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069.
85. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421.
86. See id. at415-19.
87. Id. at421.
88. Id. at404.
89. Id. In his dissenting opinion in Hagen, Justice Blackmnun emphasized that the term "restored
to the public domain" contained a highly ambiguous meaning and if the majority chose to focus on
that term, application of the rules of construction would still require a finding in favor of the Indians
due to the questionable interpretation of the term. See id. at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at415.
91. The 1905 Act provided that the reservation open under the "homestead and townsite laws of
the United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069. This language closely
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More striking, however, was the Court's assertion that the 1902 and 1905
Acts be read together because Congress clearly viewed the 1902
legislation as the basic building block for the 1905 Act, resulting in
diminishment of the reservation.92 Because the Court based its decision
in large part on the 1902 Act that never took effect, the ruling garnered
staunch criticism.93
The Supreme Court did not rest its decision on this analysis alone,
however, but relied heavily on Solem's third prong for its main
authority.94 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the fact
that nearly eighty-five percent of the present-day area residents were
non-Indians exhibited congressional intent to diminish the reservation.95
Also, tribal headquarters stood on trust land, not in the open area.96
Modem demographics, the Court asserted, reinforced its finding of
diminishment.
97
The Hagen Court's application of the three-part disestablishment test
reflected the problems inherent in the analytical framework created by
Solem. The Court found diminishment despite the absence of the type of
unequivocal evidence customarily required to find an intent to
diminish.98 While supposedly applying traditional principles of statutory
resembled the legislation that opened the Klamath River Reservation in Maltz, which did not
diminish the reservation. See Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481,496 (1973).
92. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 415-16. Employing Salem's second prong, the Court asserted that
legislative history supported its reading of the 1902 and 1905 Acts. The Court referred to the House
version of the 1905 Act that would have restored the surplus lands to the "public domain" as
probative, even though the Senate version struck that wording and it never became operative. Id. at
418-20. Admitting that "we have no way of knowing for sure" why Congress chose to offer entry
under the homestead laws rather than restore the lands to the public domain, the Court nonetheless
felt that "it seems likely" Congress merely intended to limit land speculation, an objective "not
inconsistent with the restoration of the unallotted lands to the public domain." Id. at 419.
93. See, e.g., James M. Girjalva et al., Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or
Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 415,416-32 (1995); Royster, supra note 11; Skibine, supra note 33;
Soil, supra note 5. But see Wendy L. Slater, "Pulling Up the Nails" from the Uintah Indian
Reservation Boundary: Hagen v. Utah, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 529, 541 (1995).
94. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420-21.
95. [When an area is predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving
'pockets of Indian allotments, finding that the land remains in 'Indian Country' seriously burdens
the administration of state and local government .... A contrary conclusion would seriously
disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area.
Id. at 420-21 (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 n.12 (1984)).
96. Id. at 421.
97. Id. at 420.
98. See Soil, supra note 5, at 544.
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construction, the Court in actuality relied on vague language that fell
well below the applicable standard. More troubling, the Court relied on
evidence of contemporary racial demographics to a more alarming
degree than ever before, apparently compensating for deficiencies in the
direct evidence.99 After Hagen, it seemed the Court would only keep a
reservation intact when the surplus land act contained no terminology
that could be construed as language of cession or termination. The test
allowed the Court to embrace questionable evidence of intent under
prongs two and three, which nearly always reflect disestablishment.
II. SOUTH DAKOTA v. YANKTON SIOUX TRIBE
A. Factual Background
In early 1998, the Supreme Court faced yet another diminishment
case, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe.' The central issue in that
case was whether the Yankton Sioux Reservation was diminished when
Congress ratified an 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux for the
sale of surplus reservation lands.' °
The diminishment issue in Yankton arose out of an insipid event: the
proposed construction of a waste management facility. 02 In 1992, the
Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District selected
land owned by a non-Indian within the original boundaries of the
Yankton Sioux Reservation (Reservation) as a site to develop a regional
landfill. 3 The Yankton Sioux Tribe (Tribe) filed an action in the Federal
District for the Southern District of South Dakota requesting an
injunction to halt construction and declaratory relief that the Tribe had
jurisdiction to regulate the facility. 14 The State raised the diminishment
issue first, asserting that Congress diminished the Reservation in 1894
when it enacted legislation embodying a negotiated land sale agreement
99. Id. at 548.
100. 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
101. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. Waste Management Dist., 890 F. Supp. 878, 879
(D.S.D. 1995), affd, 99 F.3d 1439 (Sth Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
102. Id. at 888-89.
103. Id. at 889.
104. Id. at 890.
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between the Tribe and the federal government, arguably defeating tribal
jurisdiction."5
In Yankton, the Court faced a complicated and ambiguous historical
record typical of most diminishment cases. Under the 1858 Treaty
between the United States and the Tribe, the Tribe relinquished control
of over eleven million acres in return for the "quiet and peaceable
possession" of 400,000 acres for the Reservation, along with direct
payment and scheduled annuities." 6 Pressure for land from settlers
expanding westward motivated Congress in 1891 to enact legislation
allotting the Reservation under the Dawes Act."7 After allotment, the
Reservation contained 168,000 acres of surplus lands.0 8 Soon thereafter,
a federal commission negotiated with the Tribe for the sale of the surplus
lands, culminating in a formal agreement on December 31, 1892,109
which Congress ratified on August 15, 1894.0
The language of the 1892 Agreement, adopted verbatim in the 1894
Act, differed in an important respect from the statutes the Court
interpreted in its other diminishment cases: the 1894 Act, essentially a
"sum-certain" sale and cession statute, contained a "savings clause."
Articles I and II of the Act provided that the Yankton Sioux agreed to
"cede, sell, relinquish, and convey.., all their claim, right, title, and
interest.., to the unallotted lands" of the reservation for "six hundred
thousand dollars.""'. Article XVIII, the savings clause, stated:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty
of April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians
and the United States .... [A]ll provisions of said treaty.., shall
be in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had
not been made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to
receive their annuities under the said treaty."2
105. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Yankton (No. 96-158 1).
106. Treaty with Yankton Tribe of Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, art. IV, 11 Stat. 743, 744.
107. Yankton, 890 F. Supp. at 881.
108. Id.
109. After considerable haggling, the government and tribe agreed to a direct sale of the land for a
sum of $600,000. S. Exec. Doc. No. 53-27, at 68 (1894).
110. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286.
111. § 12, 28 Stat. at 314-15. Articles I and II of the 1894 Yankton statute mirrored nearly word-
for-word the statute in question in Decoteau. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
112. § 12, 28 Stat. at318.
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Savings clauses are far from uniform, and no other treaty or agreement
in existence used language identical to that used here."3 The problem in
Yankton was that the cession language used in articles I and II appeared
to contradict directly the language of article XVIII.
Following the opening of the reservation, the state government
assumed virtually exclusive jurisdiction over the area. South Dakota state
courts exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction over cases arising on
nontrust lands." 4 Non-Indians constituted over two-thirds of the popu-
lation and owned ninety-one percent of the nontrust land in the region. 5
B. Procedural History
The district court granted declaratory judgment, finding that Congress
did not diminish the Reservation.'16 The district court relied heavily on
the existence of the savings clause in the 1894 statute and held that its
phraseology, when read together with the clear cession language and
sale clauses of the other articles, created internal inconsistency that
destroyed any clear intent to diminish. 17 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling based on similar reasoning."8 This decision
conflicted with earlier South Dakota Supreme Court decisions that found
diminishment."' Presumably for this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 2°
113. Yankton, 890 F. Supp. at 885.
114. Id. at 887.
115. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. Waste Management Dist., 99 F.3d 1439, 1455-58 (8th
Cir. 1996), rev'dsub nom. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
116. Yankton, 890 F. Supp. at 879.
117. Id. at 885.
118. Yankton, 99 F.3d at 1451-57.
119. Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in an
unrelated case determined that Congress had intended to diminish the reservation notwithstanding
the decisions of the federal district court and circuit court. See State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854
(S.D. 1997). The state supreme court held that the specific cession and sum certain provisions of the
1894 Act controlled despite the savings clause. Id. The court also held that de facto diminishment
had occurred, based on the jurisdictional history and population patterns of the area. Id.
120. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
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C. The Supreme Court's Holding
On January 26, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that
Congress clearly intended to diminish the Reservation in 1894.2 The
Court declared that the express language of the 1894 Act, the legislative
history, and evidence of subsequent state jurisdictional control and
demographic data all indicated an intent to diminish.
2
In applying Solem's first prong, the Court focused on articles I and II
of the 1894 Act, concluding that the statutory language evinced a
congressional intent to diminish." In the Court's view, article I's
"cession" language, in tandem with article II's provision for "sum
certain" consideration,'24 was "precisely suited" to terminating the
reservation status. 25 Under Solem's second prong, the Court reasoned
that the manner in which the government negotiated the transaction with
the Tribe and the tenor of legislative reports presented to Congress
revealed a contemporaneous understanding that the 1894 Act modified
the Reservation. 26 Lastly, the Court applied Solem's third prong, holding
that because the area remained predominantly populated by non-Indians,
de facto diminishment had occurred.'27
III. THE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED NATURE OF THE SOLEM
TEST AND A BETTER APPROACH
The Yankton decision did more to convolute, rather than clarify, the
already addled doctrine governing reservation diminishment. Instead of
discarding the capricious Solem test in favor of a more direct method, the
Yankton Court twisted the rules of construction even further. The result
was more inequitable than that reached in prior cases. Although the
Court continues to cite the rules of construction, it is difficult to ascertain
how the Court reached its holding in Yankton in light of these canons.
Moreover, Solem's "fairly clean analytical structure"'2 allows the Court
to circumvent the traditional principles governing the interpretation of
121. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).




126. Id. at 802.
127. Id. at 804.
128. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
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Indian statutes in favor of a piecemeal approach in which the Court picks
and chooses which factors will prove decisive in each case. The Court's
approach permits the Justices' subjective beliefs to serve as grounds for
limiting tribal authority in favor of non-Indian interests.'29
Returning to a standard that focuses exclusively on statutory language
as the sole determinative factor in the diminishment cases would avoid
inequitable results. More importantly, such an analytical framework
would give proper effect to the trust doctrine, which requires the Court to
honor its solemn duty to protect the tribes when confronted with
anything less than clear congressional intent to interfere with Indian
sovereign rights.
A. Solem's First Prong: The Court's Disregard of the Rules of
Construction When Examining Express Statutory Language
Consistent with Solem, the Court first examined the 1894 Act's
language, recognizing that it provided "[t]he most probative evidence" of
intent. 3 ' In so doing, the Court dismissed the manifest ambiguity created
in the 1894 Act by the "sum-certain" cession language and the
juxtapositioned savings clause.' 31 Instead, the Court examined each
individual article of the Act,132 thus denigrating the fundamental canon of
statutory construction that commands courts to read all sections of a
statute together and give all parts equal force.1
33
1. Misplaced Reliance on Decoteau v. District County Court
The Court relied on the fact that the 1894 Act's language
corresponded to the language that terminated the Lake Traverse
Reservation in Decoteau.33 The Yankton Court's reliance on Decoteau is
questionable, given the debatable nature of Decoteau's holding.
Arguably, the similar cession language in Decoteau and Yankton only
129. See Phillip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1137 (1990); Getches, supra note 43; Ralph IV. Johnson &
Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 1 (1995);
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1991).
130. Yankton, I I S. CL at 798.
131. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
132. Yankton, I IS S. Ct. at 799 (refusing to give agreement "holistie" construction).
133. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
134. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 798; see also supra note 57.
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completed a sale of land for an agreed price.' Because every surplus
land act had one distinct motivating purpose-to lure white settlers onto
the reservation by offering inexpensive parcels-most of the statutes
contained some form of cession terminology necessary to effectuate the
land transfer. 36 A sale of land, however, does not necessarily concede
loss of jurisdictional authority over it.
As the dissent in Decoteau pointed out, not one word exists in the
cession language used in Decoteau and Yankton to suggest alteration of
the reservation boundaries. 37  The Decoteau majority could only
determine intent to disestablish by looking to other factors,' 38 thus
implying that the cession and sum-certain language, standing alone,
proved indeterminate on its face. In Decoteau, the Court relied almost
exclusively on surrounding circumstances to reach its conclusion.'
39
Yankton appears to adopt the premise that Congress's use of cession
language combined with a sum-certain payment always indicates
diminishment, despite the absence of any statutory language regarding
the intended effect on jurisdictional authority. 4 ' Without referring to
additional evidence from the legislative history of the 1894 Act showing
a "clear and plain" intent to diminish, the Yankton Court's reliance on the
cession language as the primary determining factor moves beyond
Decoteau's holding. If the Court had engaged in its chosen practice of
looking to a number of factors other than cession language to consider
diminishment, including surrounding circumstances, it would have
understood the ambiguous nature of the inclusion of the lump-sum
provision in this instance. The commission's negotiations with the Tribe,
135. See Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 461 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. See Singer, supra note 129, at 21-22.
137. Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 445.
139. Id. at 444-49; Royster, supra note 11, at 33.
140. The Yankton Court also found it probative that the 1894 Act simply ratified a negotiated
agreement between the tribe and federal government. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S.
Ct. 789, 799 (1998). Such evidence of a negotiated agreement played prominent roles in Decoteau
and Rosebud and now forms an important factor in the intent equation. Although the Court believes
that a statute ratifying a negotiated agreement provides more secure footing for finding
diminishment, at no point in Yankton does the Court ask the threshold question required by the rules
of construction: Would the tribe have understood the 1894 Act to have dissolved its jurisdictional
authority over the surplus lands? If the Court had engaged in such analysis, undoubtedly the savings
clause would have militated against a finding of disestablishment. See generally Charles F.
Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth "--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601 (1975)
(discussing role of rules of construction in federal Indian law).
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the stated desires of the Yankton Sioux, and the House of
Representatives debate all plainly divulge that a lump-sum price was
included for reasons other than jurisdiction and sovereignty.' 4
Although it might appear that Decoteau provides strong precedent for
finding diminishment in Yankton, the Court overlooked a basic defect in
its analogy: the 1891 Act opening the Lake Traverse Reservation in
Decoteau did not include a savings clause, and therefore contained no
internal ambiguity on the face of the statute as in Yankton. Indeed, the
existence of the savings clause precludes any presumption that might
otherwise arise from the cession and sum-certain provisions.
2. Inherent Ambiguity Created by the Article XVIII Savings Clause
Even if articles I and II indicate a congressional intent to terminate,
the article XVIII savings clause confounds such an assessment and
makes the 1894 Act undeniably ambiguous. The savings clause
constitutes the strongest such clause of any unallotted land sale
agreement between a tribe and the United States in history. 42 Although
the Court previously considered a number of savings clauses in other
agreements, none proved as extensive because they were limited by
language explaining that the prior treaties remained in effect as long as
they were not inconsistent with the later agreement.' Article XVIII
141. The government's original instructions to the Commission designated "appraisement and
sale to the highest bidder" as the intended sale option. See S. Exec. Doc. No. 53-27, at 68 (1894).
The Tribe believed it would receive more money for the land if it were sold piece-by-piece to
individual settlers. Id. at 67-68. The Commissioner, however, feared that the less desired lands
would not sell under such an arrangement and opted for the direct sale method. Id. The House of
Representatives amended the agreement to provide for payment only as individual parcels of the
unallotted lands sold, apparently due to concern regarding whether all the land would sell. Id.
However, the House withdrew its amendment to avoid any charge of bad faith for changing the
terms of the agreement. 53 Cong. Rec. 8268, 8268-71 (1894). Thus, the intent behind the provision
of a lump-sum payment is arguably ambiguous and does not evidence a "clear and plain" intent to
disestablish the reservation. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984).
142. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. Waste Management Dist., 99 F.3d 1439, 1447 (8th
Cir. 1996), rev'dsub nom. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
143. See, e.g., Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 761
(1985) ("iNlothing in this agreement shall be construed to deprive [the tribe] of any benefits to
which they are entitled under existing treaties not inconsistent with the provisions of this
agreement."); United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 162 (1971)
(discussing Act of Apr. 29, 1874, ch. 136, art. IV, 18 Stat. (pt. 3) 36, 37, which stated that "[all treaty
provisions] not altered by this agreement shall continue in force."); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S.
340, 352 (1908) (treaty provisions "not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement are hereby
continued in force"). Although the statutes at issue in Rosebud contained savings clauses with the
"not inconsistent with" language, the majority did not discuss them. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,
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contains no such limitation. The clause only states that earlier provisions
of the original treaty remain in force;'" yet, the Court read such a
restriction into the clause.
145
To avoid the apparent conflict the 1894 Act provisions present, the
Court strained to limit its interpretation of the savings clause. Despite the
clause's explicit declaration that all provisions of the 1858 treaty "shall
be in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not
been made," the Court refused to construe the language literally.
46
Instead, the Court held that it could not reconcile the savings clause with
another provision in the 1858 treaty in which the United States agreed
that "[n]o white person [would] be permitted to reside or make any
settlement upon any part of the [reservation]."' 47 According to the
Court's curbed assessment, this latter 1858 stipulation "clearly runs
counter to [the] tribe's... claims" and to read the savings clause in such
a manner "eviscerates the agreement in which it appears."'
14
The Court's conclusion concerning the wording in the 1858 treaty
prohibiting white settlement is easily challenged because the language
relied on by the Court expresses nothing more than pre-Civil War
separatist notions. The treaty provision simply voices the commonly held
view of the early nineteenth century that the purpose of the reservation
system was to segregate the races. 49 Congress abandoned that idea and
sought to promote a policy that intermingled white settlers with Indians
on reservations when it implemented the allotment policy three decades
later.5 Understood in this context, the phrasing barring white settlement
430 U.S. 584, 623 (1977) (Marshall, J, dissenting). The dissent concluded thet the savings clauses
constituted "clear congressional commands to interpret the Rosebud Acts so as to minimize conflicts
with the Treaty of 1889," demonstrating Congress's wish to preserve the reservation boundaries. Id.
144. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 12, 28 Stat. 286, 318.
145. See Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799.
146. Id.
147. Treaty with Yankton Tribe of Sioux, Apr. 19, 1958, U.S.-Yankton Tribe of Sioux, 11 Stat.
743; Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799.
148. The Court referred to Oregon Deptartment of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe,
which eluded that when a savings clause creates a "glaring inconsistency" between the original
treaty and a subsequent agreement, it is afforded little weight. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799; see Oregon
Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985). The Court neglected to note,
however, that the effect of the savings clause was not at issue in Klamath and not explicitly
considered by the Court. See Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799; Oregon Dept. ofFish & Wildlife, 473
U.S. 753.
149. See Hoxie, supra note 18, at 2.
150. Id. at 70.
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in the 1858 treaty is irrelevant in light of subsequent policy changes, and
has no bearing on the intent of the savings clause to guarantee that the
Reservation remain intact under the broad terms of the treaty creating it.
The Court overlooked the reservation system's original purpose and
instead speculated that article XVIII merely "pertains to the continuance
of annuities, not the 1858 borders."'' For support, the Court turned to
the 1892 negotiations, noting that the topic of annuities played a
significant role in the bargaining.'52 Based on this fact, the Court
disregarded the broad phrasing of the savings clause and found that it
only protected annuities.'53 The Court went as far as to conclude that "it
is hard to identify any provision in the 1858 Treaty that the Tribe might
have sought to preserve, other than those plainly inconsistent with... the
1894 Act."1
54
The Court's construction of the savings clause, grievously flawed in
several respects, flies directly in the face of the rules of construction. The
savings clause of the 1894 Act is arguably the most direct statement
imaginable indicating a desire to preserve the core principles embodied
in the 1858 treaty creating the Yankton Sioux Reservation.'55 In pursuing
the treaty-making policy of the nineteenth century, the federal
government created distinct geographical enclaves for the Indians that
gave tribal governments sovereign power within their borders.
56
Accordingly, the 1858 treaty with the Yankton Sioux recognized the
151. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 800. Congress previously prescribed the reach of an annuities pro-
vision, but it chose not to enact that type of limited provision in the 1894 Yankton Act. See, e.g.,
Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 489 (1937) ("[N]othing in the agreement
was to be construed to deprive [the Indians] of their annuities or benefits under any existing
agreements or treaty stipulations.").
152. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799.
153. I
154. Id. at 800.
155. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 12,28 Stat. 286,318.
156. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 140, at 602-23 (discussing history of
treaty-making between tribes and United States).
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specific borders of the Reservation,'57 and granted the Tribe full
governmental authority within its boundaries.'58 Thus, because the
savings clause preserved the "full force and effect" of the 1858 treaty, it
concurrently kept the borders of the Reservation intact, "the same as
though [the] agreement had not been made."'5 9 The Court escaped this
conclusion by limiting its interpretation and abrogating the rules of
construction. 6 '
If the Court had remained true to the canons of construction, it would
have reached a different conclusion because rules demand that all
provisions of an agreement be read together in a manner that will make
them consistent and give all parts force. 6 ' The savings clause's broad
phraseology indicates that the other sections, not the clause itself, should
be read narrowly to minimize any conflict with the 1858 treaty. Despite
the Court's claim that the subject of annuities "dominated" the
negotiations,' 62 the record shows that the Tribe expressed concern over
numerous other issues.'63 More importantly, only the second independent
clause of the second sentence mentions annuities, and it follows the
broad language professing to preserve the 1858 treaty."M  The
interpretation offered by the Court gives effect to only one independent
clause in one sentence. Not only did the Court refuse to analyze the
saving clause in conjunction with articles I and II, as required by the
rules of construction, it refused to examine the savings clause in its
157. The 1858 treaty specifically delineated, the boundaries of the Reservation, stating that the
Yankton Sioux ceded and relinquished to the United States:
[A]I1 the lands now owned... except four hundred thousand acres thereof, situated and
described as follows, to wit-Beginning at the mouth of the ... Chouteau River and extending
up the Missouri River thirty miles; thence due north to a point; thence easterly to a point on the
said Chouteau River, thence down said river to the place beginning, so as to include the said
quantity of four hundred thousand acres.
Treaty with Yankton Tribe of Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, U.S.-Yankton Tribe of Sioux, 11 Stat. 743, 744.
158. Id.
159. Ch. 290,§ 12,28 Stat. at318.
160. The Court concluded that "the Treaty's reference to tribal authority is indirect, at best" and
did not maintain exclusive tribal governance within the original reservation boundaries. South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1998). Apparently, despite knowledge of the
general intent behind the treaty policy, the Court would require the savings clause to stipulate each
and every tribal governmental power intended for preservation as a prerequisite for recognizing
retention of tribal sovereignty.
161. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
162. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799.
163. S. Exec. Doc. No. 53-27, at 55, 57-58 (1894).
164. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
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entirety, choosing instead to emphasize the portion of the provision that
supported its holding.1 65 This approach is nonsensical given that the 1858
treaty constitutes the only instrument that speaks directly to the
Reservation boundaries.1" Giving effect to the plain language and all
parts of article XVIII leads to the conclusion that it covers more than
annuities. If read broadly, article XVIII's "full force and effect" language
requires the agreement to be construed to preserve the Tribe's
governmental authority within the boundaries under the 1858 treaty,
defeating any claim of diminishment.
The Court's interpretation violated the rules of construction in another
more discernible manner. Articles I and II are intrinsically irreconcilable
with the savings clause, and therefore create inherent ambiguity. In view
of this contradiction, the rules instruct that the ambiguity be resolved in
favor of the tribe. 67 Nonetheless, the Court abdicated its responsibility to
adhere to this rule, referring to Decoteau and stating that a rule of
construction "is not.., a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal
and congressional intent." 6 '
The approach adopted under Solem's first prong of looking to express
statutory language as the best indicator of intent is correct, but only as
long as the Court adheres to the rules of construction. The rules mandate
that to find diminishment, congressional intent must prove "clear and
plain."169 Logically, because the text of a statute is the only thing actually
enacted into law, it best expresses what Congress intended. 70 As the
Court itself observed, "Congress has used clear language of express
termination when that result is desired."' 7' Therefore, Solem's first prong
would provide equitable results if the Supreme Court returned to this
type of straightforward analysis, focusing on the express language of an
165. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 799.
166. See supra note 157.
167. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
168. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 801 (quoting Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447
(1975)).
169. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
170. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("There is, of course,
no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature
undertook to give expression to its wishes.").
171. Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n.22 (1973); see, e.g., Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 248, 15
Stat. 198, 221 ("Mhe Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued."); Fulfilling Treaty
Stipulations with and Support of Indian Tribes, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 193, 218 (1904) ("Mhe




act while giving equal effect to all portions of the statute and conforming
to the rule that ambiguities favor the tribe."72 Such an approach gives
meaning to the trust doctrine and tribal sovereignty. 73
Instead, as evidenced by Yankton, the analysis under Solem's first
prong founders because the Court shunned those principles and perverted
the analysis. By disposing of obvious ambiguities in the statutory
language and fractionating its analysis, the Court appears willing to
preserve reservation status only in instances where the acts contain
absolutely no language the Court can arguably construe as language of
termination. Such a mode of analysis is fundamentally flawed and stands
in stark opposition to the tenets of Indian law.
B. Solem's Second Prong: Inadequacy of Legislative History and
Surrounding Circumstances to Show Intent
Given the many difficulties plaguing inquiry into legislative history in
the diminishment cases, the Yankton Court should have recognized these
short-comings and abandoned Solem's second prong. Requiring the
Court to delve into examinations of legislative history only obfuscates
the diminishment issue. First, the Court must struggle to determine in
which context to view the evidence: one that focuses on the intent from
the perspective of the forlorn allotment policy, or one cognizant of the
modern realization that allotment was an abysmal failure. Next, if it
chooses to explore intent from the perspective of the allotment era, it
faces the unfeasibility of trying to understand the motivations fueling a
bygone era. Finally, the task of discovering intent through legislative
history proves utterly impossible because Congress at the time did not
have any intent to address the jurisdiction question. Most importantly,
the inquiry into intent proves unnecessary because the architects of the
allotment policy never foresaw the jurisdiction problem; therefore, the
surplus land acts are ambiguous by their very nature. As long as the
Court adheres to the rules of construction and resolves all ambiguities in
favor of the tribes, inquiry into legislative history is not needed. The only
purpose legislative history serves is to allow justices to manipulate the
facts in favor of their own subjective beliefs.
172. See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496-97; Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368
U.S. 351, 354-56 (1962); see also Royster, supra note 11, at 39-41.
173. See Royster, supra note 11, at 47-49.
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1. The Quandary of Selecting the Proper Perspective for
Determining Intent
The first major difficulty that impairs the Court's legislative history
analysis is determining how to view the effect of social change when
reviewing legislative history. Every statute carries with it certain
assumptions about the nature of law and society that may be incorrect,
shallow, or extinct in light of social change. When change indeed occurs,
judges are placed in the impossible predicament of trying to determine
how to best address the interpretive question."
This dilemma proves especially problematic in the diminishment
cases. Throughout American history, federal Indian policy has fluctuated
wildly. The most significant redirection occurred as a result of the
allotment policy. In 1934, Congress repudiated the allotment scheme
with passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 7' which
condemned the Dawes General Allotment Act as failed policy.'76 The
core concepts the IRA endorsed form the cornerstone of modem U.S.
Indian policy: the preservation and encouragement of tribal control over
Indian country.'77 Thus, when examining the legislative history
surrounding a surplus land act the question becomes: Should the Court
ask how Congress in the late nineteenth century would have answered
the jurisdiction question, even though Congress did not envision the
continuation of the reservation system? Or, should the Court inquire how
that legislature would answer the question after realizing that the
allotment policy was a complete and utter failure? This quandary reveals
the futility of looking to legislative history as an indicator of intent in
these cases.
The Yankton decision sheds light on the Court's preferred approach
under these circumstances. In Yankton, the Court looked to "the
contemporary historical context" to discover the intent of Congress in
174. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 330-31 (1990).
175. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1994)).
176. Primarily, the IRA promoted Indian self-government and protected and increased the amount
of land preserved for Indian control by repealing the Dawes Act, restoring surplus lands to tribal
ownership, and ending allotment. See generally Hoxie, supra note 18; Indian Self-Rule: First-hand
Accounts of Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1986); Francis
Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and American Indians (1984);
Singer, supra note 129, at 31.
177. Royster, supra note 11, at 19-20.
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1894.171 Instead of giving credence to the modem policy recognizing
tribal sovereignty, the Yankton Court chose to perpetuate the allotment
policy expressly rejected by Congress.
179
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation, it proves curious that the
Yankton Court focused on the intent of the Congress that implemented
the Dawes Act, rather than the intent of the Congress responsible for
enactment of the IRA, given that the latter nullified the former. Normally
when two statutes conflict, the more recent applies. 8 ' The best
explanation for the Court's analysis is that, once again, it is simply trying
to reach a conclusion that corresponds to the Justices' own subjective
notion that tribes should not have jurisdictional control over lands
predominated by whites.' By rendering decisions consistent with the
allotment era's policies, the Court accomplishes this goal. It does so,
however, at the cost of frustrating the obvious modem policy supporting
tribal sovereignty.
2. The Problem ofDiscovering Intent from Antiquated Legislation
The second problem associated with relying on legislative history as
an accurate indicator of congressional intent rests on the dubious
proposition that judges can accurately recreate the historical
understanding of a previous legislature."2 The task of interpretation
proves especially complex in the diminishment cases because most
surplus land acts are nearly a century old. This time gap requires the
Court to attempt to decipher the "surrounding circumstances" of the
surplus land acts within their antiquated context-a nearly impossible
task. The result has been majority and dissenting opinions that examine
the same evidence but tell vastly different stories.'83
178. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789, 802 (1998).
179. Id. at 805 ("[D]espite the present-day understanding of a 'government-to-government
relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe'... 'we cannot remake history."').
180. Singer, supra note 129, at 31-32.
181. Cf Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
423 (1989) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 n.9 (1980)) ("'It defies common
sense to suppose Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become
subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate
destruction of tribal government."').
182. See G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 569
(1982).
183. Decoteau, Rosebud, and Hagen each produced lively dissents that disagreed vehemently
with the majority's reading concerning most of the key facts. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421
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3. Difficulties of Determining Intent from Meager Historical Evidence
A final complication with determining intent through legislative
history centers on the fact that a court must ascertain the intent of
different bodies of people, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate,
whose views are only known from the historical record."4 The historical
record almost never reveals why each legislator voted as he or she did.'
These difficulties manifest themselves because at the time Congress
passed the surplus land acts, it did not foresee the continuation of the
reservation system.'86 As a policy matter, Congress had no reason to
address the issue of continued jurisdiction over reservation lands. The
legislative history demonstrates Congress's "almost complete lack
of... concern with the boundary issue."' 87 The end result is that
although in each diminishment case a voluminous historical record
confronts the trier of fact, the evidence inevitably contains sparse
references to the jurisdiction question, thus obfuscating attempts to
attribute an intent to Congress.
Given this paucity of evidence concerning the jurisdictional issue, the
approach to legislative history endorsed by Solem's second prong
threatens the sanctity of the rules of construction. Solem instructs that
when an act contains express language indicating a congressional intent
to diminish, the Court should only examine extrinsic evidence to confirm
the language on the face of the act.'88 Only in the complete absence of
express language of termination must the legislative history and
surrounding circumstances "unequivocally" reveal a congressional intent
to diminish.'89 Faced with a dearth of historical proof, the Court has
frequently trumped-up or skewed the meager evidence available to
support a finding of diminishment. 9 ' Thus, because the Court's most
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 459 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
184. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1930).
185. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 174, at 326.
186. See Solem v. Bartlett. 465 U.S. 463.468 (1984).
187. Comment, New Town et al.: The Future ofan Illusion, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 117 (1973).
188. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
189. Id.; see also Slater, supra note 93, at 553-54.
190. For instance, in Rosebud the Court used just two quotations from the House debates on the
1904 Act opening the reservation and three quotations from the Committee Reports to buoy its
conclusion that the legislative history "clearly" showed an intent to disestablish. Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 627 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Hagen, the Court referenced
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recent trend is to bend the analysis under Solem's first prong to fird an
intent to diminish on the face of a given allotment act, the Court rarely
needs to find that the legislative history "unequivocally" reveals an intent
to diminish.
This approach to legislative history contravenes the canons of
construction. The canons mandate that the Court find "clear and
unequivocal intent" in order to determine diminishment and resolve
ambiguities in favor of the tribe. Remaining true to the canons, the Court
should consistently find in favor of the tribe because the ambiguity in the
historical record destroys any clear intent. Yet, because the historical
evidence need not prove "unequivocally" an intent to terminate under
Solem, application of the second-prong standard allows the Court to side-
step the canons and resolve ambiguities against the Indians. As a result,
the Court need only find supplemental support, which does not satisfy
the "clarity" of intent required under the rules of construction.
The Yankton decision illustrates the problem. The Court stated that the
legislative history and surrounding circumstances are "not so compelling
that, standing alone, [they] would indicate diminishment." 9'
Nonetheless, the Court held that the record did not controvert its
diminishment finding and should therefore not be discounted. 92 Instead
of redirecting the analysis under Solem and stating that ambiguities in the
historical record should always favor the tribe, the Court embraced
scattered references in the legislative record and negotiations between
the Tribe and the government that supported a finding of diminishment
to buttress its conclusion. 93
the House version of the 1905 Act that opened the Uintah Ouray Reservation, which would have
restored lands to the public domain, as support for its holding. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 436-37
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet, the Court ignored legislative history showing that the Senate
version, which Congress ultimately enacted, struck this language in favor of more moderate
wording. Id.
191. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789, 802 (1998).
192. Id. at 803.
193. Although the Court stated that "[t]he legislative history itself adds little" and the "mixed
record" concerning contemporaneous understanding of the 1894 Act "'reveals no consistent, or even
dominant, approach to the territory in question," it still held that the historical information supported
diminishment. Id. at 802-04. As evidence of intent, the Court cited the instructions provided by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Yankton Commission, charging its members to
"negotiate... for the cession of [the tribe's) surplus lands." Id. The Court also referred to comments
made by Yankton Commissioner Cole, in which he admonished the Tribe that "you must break
down the barriers and invite the white man," as further proof of an intent to terminate. Id. at 802.
Lastly, following Solem, the Court looked to subsequent treatment of the Reservation by both
Congress and the Executive Branch. Id. at 803. Despite the fact that both Congress and the
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C. Solem's Third Prong: Inappropriate Reliance on De Facto
Diminishment
As the final means for discovering intent, the Court has employed the
peculiar technique of looking to evidence of subsequent state
jurisdictional control over the contested area and its modem racial
composition as proof of "de facto diminishment."' 94 More than any other
part of Solem's analytical structure, the third prong allows the Court to
circumvent the tenets of Indian law to construct an intent that accords
with its own subjective notions as to the proper resolution of the
jurisdiction question. The logical connection between Congress's intent
at the turn of the century and consequent state influence and modem
demography is attenuated at best, as the Court itself recognizes.195 Yet,
the Court continues to rely on such evidence because in nearly all cases it
harmonizes the Court's own assumptions as to the expectations of non-
Indians living in the area. In the end, the Court's weighing and balancing
of non-Indian interests ultimately impinges on the core concepts of tribal
sovereignty.
1. Recognizing Subsequent State Jurisdictional Control Unjustly
Disadvantages Tribes
By giving credence to subsequent state jurisdictional control over
territory opened by a surplus land act, the Court essentially penalizes the
tribes for the failures of allotment. The allotment policy wrought
destruction on the tribes and, as a result, the tribes suffered extreme
impoverishment and lost much of their ability to assert their sovereign
powers.'96 But the Dawes Act did not abolish tribal governments, and
thus tribal governmental powers merely went dormant during the era.
Most tribes simply were not in a position to assert their sovereign powers
until 1934, with passage of the IRA, or later, when the tribes tried to
resuscitate themselves economically and politically from the devastating
Executive referred to the Reservation in contradictory terms, often indicating that the surplus lands
retained their reservation status, the Court still refused to implement the rule that ambiguities create
a presumption in favor of the tribe, finding that the ambiguities "carried but little force." Id. at 804.
194. See Solem,465 U.S. at471.
195. Seeid. at472 n.13.
196. One of the underlying principles of the allotment policy was the eventual disestablishment




effects of allotment.' 97 Thus, during the interim period, the tribes were
vulnerable to state encroachment.
Generally, the Court has refused to prejudice the tribes for their failure
to exercise tribal power during these periods.'98 In the diminishment
cases, however, the Court has departed from this well-established
standard.'99 Instead, the Court's countenance of state encroachment as
valid evidence of intent flies in the face of the established proposition
that sovereign tribal governments do not lose legislative power when
they do not implement it.200 In this respect, the Court deprives the tribes
of sovereign powers when it recognizes state encroachment as a means
of displacing tribal authority.
On a more rudimentary level, the Court's reliance on jurisdictional
history should be censured in light of the trust doctrine. The courts have
generally served as the conscience of federal Indian law, protecting tribal
powers and rights against undue intrusion when the tribes are weakest.
Allotment debilitated tribal governmental authority; therefore, according
to the trust doctrine, the Court should protect tribal autonomy in the
diminishment cases. Yet, Solem's third prong forwards the perverse
notion that traditional Indian rights are not to be defended precisely when
they need the most protection-when a dominant state government
frustrates the exercise of tribal power by extending its own authority over
tribal domain.
2. The Irrelevance of Modern Demography to the Intent Analysis
The Court's utilization of demographics opposes traditional Indian
law concepts. The Court's reliance on demographics is perhaps
understandable, given the ambiguity surrounding the diminishment
analysis. Demographic data will often be the only consistent evidence
easily discernible by the Court. However, the threshold question centers
197. Id.
198. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 385-89 (1976); Kennerly v. District Court, 400
U.S. 423,429-30 (1971); see also Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 38-39.
199. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994) ("This 'jurisdictional history'.. . demonstrates
a[n] ... acknowledgment that the Reservation was diminished...."); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) ("[Tlhe single most salient fact is the unquestioned actual
assumption of state jurisdiction over the unallotted lands ... since the passage of the 1904
Act....").
200. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) ("[S]overeign power, even
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on whether proof of demographic advantage of one ethnic group over
another as a deciding factor constitutes principled analysis. At best,
demographics form a "tangential relation" to historical intent.2"'
Nowhere in its diminishment jurisprudence does the Court explain
why demography provides an accurate reflection of Congress's intent at
the turn of the century. The Solem Court referred to demographic
evidence as only "one additional clue" both "unorthodox and potentially
unreliable," but also termed it a "necessary expedient."2 2
In reality, the Court is attempting to find a practical, rather than
doctrinal, relationship between present demographics and the
construction of aged statutes. In Hagen, the Court stated: "IT]he current
population situation in the Uintah Valley demonstrates a practical
acknowledgment that the Reservation was diminished; a contrary
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the
people living in the area."20 3 This reasoning begs the question: a practical
acknowledgment by whom? 2°4 It is difficult to attribute a "practical
acknowledgment" to Congress 100 years earlier because the historical
record often lacks such evidence. To assert a "practical
acknowledgment" by state officials or white settlers on the land is
irrelevant to the central inquiry because their conclusions mirror only
their own beliefs, not Congress's intent. Therefore, the most reasonable
conclusion is that the Court made its own "practical acknowledgment"
that the reservation had been diminished because "a contrary conclusion
would seriously disrupt the expectations" of the non-Indians residing in
the area.2 5 The demographic standard emulates the trend in the Court's
modem Indian law decisions: the Court is reluctant to acknowledge tribal
authority over non-Indians living on the reservation.20 6
The Court's use of demographic data suffers from two primary
weaknesses. First, although the Court in Solem labeled modem
demography as only "one additional clue," it takes on far greater
201. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,472 n.13 (1984).
203. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
204. Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to
Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 781, 792 (1996).
205. Id.
206. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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meaning in application.2"7 Given that demography often constitutes the
only indisputable evidence in these cases and that the demographic
analysis allows the Court to interject current "practical" considerations
into the analysis, the "clue" confounds diminishment analysis, which
supposedly centers on a historical examination of intent." 8 As long as the
Court views demography as a viable component of the diminishment
test, rarely will an indeterminate statutory text stand in the way of the
Court's consideration of the "justifiable expectations" of the people of
the region. Instead of looking to intent as mandated by the rules of
construction, the Court weighs and balances non-Indian interests against
the sovereignty of the tribes. In the end, under the application of Solem's
third prong, the Indians' minority status costs them their rights.
This balancing process suggests the second problem with the use of
demography: by asserting that demography reflects intent, the Court can
hide behind the fagade of statutory construction to reach political
resolutions. By weighing the merits of retaining a reservation in light of
the "justifiable expectations" of non-Indians who settled on the surplus
lands, the Court becomes the final arbiter of how much governing
authority tribes may exercise, assuming a prerogative that formally lies
with Congress.2" 9 However, as the Court has acknowledged, the power to
discontinue reservation status rests with Congress, which can clearly
express itself if it so wishes."0 According to its own reasoning, the Court
should not address such political questions. The Court should leave
determinations of the proper extent of tribal jurisdiction in Indian country
to Congress, under its plenary authority, where they belong.
3. Yankton 's Application ofSolem 's Third Prong: An Illustration of
the Approach's Shortcomings
Despite wide-spread academic criticism of the analytical deficiencies
inherent in Solem's third prong,' the Yankton decision reveals that the
Court will continue to utilize evidence of subsequent state jurisdictional
207. See Hagen, 510 U.S. at 420-22.
208. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1970) ("Our analysis of surplus land Acts requires
that Congress clearly evince an 'intent... to change... boundaries' before diminishment will
be found.").
209. Getches, supra note 43, at 1575.
210. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 470; Mattz v. Amett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n.22 (1973).
211. See, e.g., Girjalva et al., supra note 93; Laurence, supra note 204; Royster, supra note 11;
Skibine, supra note 33; Soil, supra note 5.
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control and demography in its diminishment analysis. Perhaps the most
frustrating aspect of the Yankton decision centers on the fact that the
Court recognized the analytical flaws under the third prong, calling such
evidence "the least compelling" indicator of intent."' Yet, after citing the
weakness, the Court turned immediately to demographic data and
evidence of state jurisdictional control as factors bolstering its
decision.2"3 Referring to the fact that non-Indians constituted over two-
thirds of the population and owned a vast majority of the nontrust land in
the region, the Court concluded that "[these] demographics signify a
diminished reservation." '214 In addition, the Court relied on evidence that
the state government assumed virtually exclusive jurisdiction over the
territory after the reservation opened.2"5
Choosing the evidence that best supported its desired result, the
Yankton Court disregarded evidence showing that the Tribe resisted
initial state incursions.216 Also, although the Court noted that the Tribe
did not attempt to assert jurisdictional control until recently,217 it did not
contemplate whether the Tribe ever stood in a position to govern
effectively during the period of state control. More troubling, the Court
recognized the predominance of non-Indians in the area, but dismissed
the demographic evidence showing a strong increase in the Indian
presence in the area.2 8 The Tribe constituted the largest employer, not
only within the boundaries of the Reservation, but within all of Charles
Mix County.219 Further, data illustrated a marked increase in the Indian
population, while the non-Indian population had steadily decreased.220
Nonetheless, the Court found this information unconvincing."
212. Consideration of subsequent jurisdictional control and demographic data was the "least
compelling for a simple reason: Every surplus land Act necessarily resulted in a surge of non-Indian
settlement and degraded the 'Indian character' of the reservation, yet we have repeatedly stated that
not every surplus land Act diminished the affected reservation." South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux




216. Brief for Respondent at 45, Yankton (No. 96-1581).
217. Yankton, 118 S. Ct. at 804.
218. Id
219. Brief for Respondent at 46, Yankton (No. 96-1581).




Demographics and jurisdictional history have undoubtedly become
entrenched in the Court's diminishment analysis. The ramifications
prove significant. Until the Court's decisions in Solem, Hagen, and
Yankton, congressional intent formed the sole basis for legal judgment.
With the advent of Solem's third prong, the legal argument moved away
from congressional intent and emphasized weighing non-Indian interests.
Because the Court maintains the myth that evidence under the third
prong provides suitable indications of intent, the Court concludes it is
reaching results in line with the trust doctrine. In actuality, the Solem
approach enables the Court to readjust tribal jurisdiction based on current
conditions irrespective of whether Congress ever intended such a change.
In so doing, the Court relegates congressional intent to a secondary
position and violates the core precepts of the trust doctrine.
D. Returning to the Appropriate Standard: Express Statutory
Language and Respect for the Trust Doctrine
The Yankton decision illustrates the need for the Court to return to its
original approach where explicit statutory language stood as the sole
determining factor in the diminishment or disestablishment question. 2
The Court's analysis in Yankton demonstrates Solem's elemental
weaknesses-the vagaries in the second prong's "surrounding
circumstances" standard and the inherent racism embodied in prong
three. Only by returning to an analytical approach that applies the rules
of construction while focusing exclusively on express statutory language
can the Court avoid Solem's problems and effectively safeguard the
principles of tribal sovereignty embodied in the trust doctrine.
Although the Court has occasionally fluctuated, it has articulated a
recurrent position congruent with the trust doctrine requiring Congress to
speak clearly when impinging on established Indian rights.223 Because
text is the only thing actually enacted into law, it most clearly expresses
Congress's intent.224 Moreover, by concentrating on the express statutory
222. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
223. Getches, supra note 43, at 1621. The Court has consistently characterized the relationship
between Congress and the American Indian as "solemn," "unique," "special," or "moral." Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 29 (1913).
224. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 174, at 337. Interpretative approaches that emphasize strict
adherence to statutory language are criticized because statutes are rarely completely unambiguous;
thus, textual analysis is difficult Id. In the context of Indian law, however, this point is moot because
the rules of construction require the courts to decide all ambiguities in favor of the tribes; hence,
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words chosen by Congress, as the Court originally did in Seymour and
Mattz, 225 the task of determining intent becomes far easier and allows for
proper application of the canons of construction. In the face of
indeterminate statutory language, a straightforward application of the
canons should guide the outcome, requiring all statutory provisions to be
read as a whole and resolving ambiguity in favor of the tribe. 26 If the
Court had relied exclusively on statutory language in Yankton, it would
have ruled in favor of the Tribe without meandering into the judicially
malleable and subjective factors included in Solem's second and third
prongs. To comply with its obligation under the trust doctrine in the
future, the Court should return to an approach that relies exclusively on
statutory language to determine diminishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding of diminishment in South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe came as a result of its continued adherence to the
three-pronged approach set out in Solem v. Bartlett, which made the rules
of construction alarmingly flexible and furnished a framework by which
the Court can reach its own desired result of preserving non-Indian
interests. The Court's ruling underscores the salient fact that significant
inconsistencies exist in the Court's analytical approach to the
diminishment/disestablishment cases, both as to governing principles and
the application of those principles. The trust doctrine and traditional rules
of construction no longer apply. The Court claimed to adhere to the
canons, but in reality it merely paid them lip service. Faced with
conflicting statutory language and vague legislative history, the Yankton
Court chose to isolate statutory terminology and parse out selective
events in the historical record to circumvent palpable ambiguity.
Although it derogates the fundamental precepts of the trust doctrine, the
Yankton Court sustained Solem's approach of relying on evidence of
subsequent state jurisdictional control and contemporary demographic
even vague statutes theoretically present no problem under a strict constructionist approach because
the canons of construction mandate the outcome. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
225. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 45, 49 and accompanying text.
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data as indicators of intent, which further buoyed the Court's finding of
diminishment.
The Court's decision in Yankton most likely defeats any expectancy
that the federal courts will depart from Solem's three-pronged test to
assert an approach truer to the rules of construction and the trust
doctrine. Instead the Court has chosen to remain married to an approach
that belies those core principles. As such, Indian jurisdictional law
remains impotent.
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